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Climate Policy and Energy Security 
Ottmar Edenhofer* and Kai Lessmann** 
Energy policy is faced with at least four crucial challenges. It has to 
balance climate protection, energy security, socio-economic acceptability, 
and equity. Balancing energy policy between these four goals is likely to be 
a challenging puzzle, much like finding a solution to the fabled magical 
squares. Between the four cornerstones of energy policy, trade-offs have to 
be made, but at the same time, pursuing the individual goals may yield 
strong synergies. 
To date, the goals of energy policy are focused on the triangle of security, 
socio-economic acceptability, and climate protection. Equity is completely 
neglected in most social cost-benefit analyses of global energy policy. 
Admittedly, we are not in a position to undertake a comprehensive social 
cost-benefit analysis according to the proposed magical square ourselves. 
With this paper we want to broaden the scope of the discussion and shed 
some light on necessary extensions of the present framework. In the first 
section, we will discuss the relationship between climate protection and 
economic growth. This discussion derives crucial criteria for sustainability 
of the energy system and allows an identification of vital energy security 
issues in section II. In the third section, we discuss policy instruments for 
improving international risk management. 
I   Climate protection and economic growth 
There is an emerging international consensus about the necessity of 
climate protection. Preventing the global mean temperature from rising 
faster than 0.2°C per decade and above 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels 
is one ambitious formulation of this challenge. Such constraints are 
necessary if dangerous perturbations of the climate system are to be 
avoided during the next decades. Otherwise impacts such as increased 
probability of extreme weather events, disturbances of the global water 
circulation, loss of biodiversity, or sudden shifts in monsoon dynamics will 
likely have to be dealt with. The imperative to avoid such impacts has been 
adopted as a “guardrail” by the German Scientific Advisory Council on 
Global Change (WBGU), which emphasized its importance again in its 
latest survey.1 
 
*  Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, <edenhofer@pik-potsdam.de>. 
**  Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, <kai.lessmann@pik-potsdam.de> 
1  German Scientific Advisory Council on Global Change (2003), World in Transition: 
Towards Sustainable Energy Systems. Earthscan, London and Sterling, 107. 
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Our calculations show that cost-effective climate protection according to 
this guardrail requires stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions within 
the next two decades in order to approach zero emissions at the end of the 
century. The gap between the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario of CO2 
emissions and the climate protection path (CPP) (see figure 1) shows the 
technical, economical, and political challenges with which humankind is 
confronted: a largely emissions-free economy at the end of the 21st century 
in order to avoid dangerous climate change requires a profound change in 
the worldwide energy system. The world economy is about to face a new 
energy crisis, probably lasting longer and being a greater challenge than 
both of the oil crises of the 1970s. The reason for this new crisis is the need 
to overcome the mitigation gap and therefore transform the worldwide 
energy system. 
Figure 1 
The mitigation gap. The area between the climate protection path (CPP) and the 
business-as-usual path (BAU) is referred to as the mitigation cap. This amount of 
carbon emissions must be mitigated over the next century. 
Unfortunately, many economists believe that overcoming this mitiga-
tion gap will be quite costly. Figure 2 shows estimated costs from several 
different studies. Stabilizing CO2 concentration at a level below 450 ppm 
leads to increasing mitigation costs. The fact that in virtually all macro-
economic models losses in gross world product (GWP) surge when a target 
of less than 550 ppm is set demonstrates just how ambitious this goal of 
climate protection is.2 
 
2  For a comparison see Morita et al. (2000) Overview of Mitigation Scenarios for Global 
Climate Stabilisation based on the New IPCC Emissions Scenarios (SRES). Environmental 
Economics and Policy Studies 3, 65–88. 
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The mitigation costs in different macroeconomic models 
Figure 2 shows that the mitigation costs of scenarios calculated by the 
MIND model are significantly lower than cost estimates from comparable 
models used in the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC, in which similar 
socio-economic scenarios are assumed.3 The calculations show that 0.6 per-
cent of GWP is required to reach the WBGU endorsed climate protection 
goal of a maximum 2°C temperature rise, for which CO2 concentration 
peaks at approximately 420 ppm. This is mainly due to the potential of 
technological change, and therefore the capacity of businesses and in-
vestors to react flexibly to the specifications of climate protection, which 
was included in the MIND model.4 In the next section we explore whether 
a path of transformation can be found that exhibits such low costs and in 
addition has a positive effect on energy security. 
II   Energy security within the magical square 
Within the next century, the energy requirements of humankind will 
likely increase four to five times relative to current demand in order to 
facilitate appropriate economic growth for the less developed countries as 
well as for the newly industrialized ones. 
Energy scenarios in accordance with the aforementioned climate guard-
rails show that the share of renewable energy in the overall energy 
consumption needs to be increased substantially in the next decades—not 
only to achieve the ambitious climate targets defined by the WBGU 
(figure 3a, p. 114) but also for a mere stabilization of CO2 concentration at 
450 ppm (figure 3b, p. 114). Nevertheless, coal, crude oil, and natural gas 
continue play an important part within the global energy mix: figure 3a 
shows how a substantial reduction in the use of fossil energy resources is 
 
3  Metz, B., Ogunlade, D., Swart, R., and J. Pan (2001) Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
4  Edenhofer, O., Bauer, N., Kriegler, E. (2005) The Impact of Technological Change on 
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necessary if the climate protection target put forward by the WBGU is 
implemented. In contrast, figure 3b indicates that fossil fuels can be used 
to their current extent, even if CO2 concentration are stabilized at 450 
ppm. In either case, fossil fuels can only be used to the extent shown if 
parts of the resulting carbon can successfully be captured from large 
power plants and be sequestered in geological formations. Despite the 
relatively high costs of carbon capturing and sequestration (CCS)—cur-
rently about 70 USD per ton of CO2—this option could become economi-
cally viable if ambitious emission caps were agreed on and implemented in 
the next few decades. The reason is the considerable technical progress in 
exploration and extraction of fossil resources. 
Figure 3 
Two scenarios for the global energy system with respect to different climate 
protection goals are shown. On the left-hand side, the climate window of the 
WBGU is imposed on the economy, on the right-hand side, a stabilization of CO2 
concentration at 450 ppm is to be achieved. 
The option of capturing CO2 from huge coal power plants and storing it 
in geological formations offers the possibility of using the fossil energy 
resources without destabilizing the climate system any further. Likewise, 
this option could be of great importance for international climate negotia-
tions: a climate policy stimulating this possibility would facilitate the 
entry of the US and other countries, such as China and India, into climate 
negotiation, because their income from coal, crude oil, and natural gas 
would be diminished less than by following climate policy without this 
option. 
Above all, the US is increasingly discussing the possibility of “Industrial 
Carbon Management,” 50 percent of emissions in industrialized countries 
are produced by point sources, such as power plants and are therefore in 
principle accessible for CCS. However, the permeability of the geological 
formations, which critically determines the leakage of CO2 from the 
sequestration site, has not been adequately investigated to date. Still, even 
at high rates of leakage of around 0.5 percent, sequestration of 160 
gigatons of carbon (GtC) in geological formations by 2050 would still be of 
advantageous for the world economy, mainly to “buy some time” by 
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postponing parts of the expensive transformation of the energy system to a 
later date. Leakage rates can be particularly “critical” in determining the 
costs of mitigation, as will be demonstrated below. 
There is no global shortage of exhaustible resource likely during the 21st 
century. Reserves of traditional commercial fuels—oil, gas, and coal—will 
suffice for decades to come. It is assumed that once conventional oil 
resources are depleted, the huge unconventional oil and gas reserves will 
be tapped for extraction and clean generating technologies mature. Coal 
reserves are especially abundant: the resource base is more than twice that 
of conventional and unconventional oil and gas. The presently known 
reserves of these resources (coal, crude oil, natural gas) amount to 
approximately 5000 GtC.5 Since the beginning of industrialization about 
283 GtC have been used up.6 In our business-as-usual-scenario we calculate 
that 2200 GtC will be extracted by the economy. If CO2 concentration was 
stabilized at 450 ppm only 1200 GtC would be extracted; about 400 GtC 
would then be captured and sequestered in order to achieve climate 
protection. 
In the scenarios considered, renewable energy resources are needed to 
provide approximately 20 percent of the worldwide secondary energy in 
2050 and 80 percent by the end of the century. But these renewable energy 
resources are thought to be too costly by some energy economists. Conse-
quently, they often favor a renaissance of nuclear energy in order to fulfill 
demands raised by climate protection. However, nuclear energy based on 
nuclear fission as a global solution is very problematic if not infeasible. 
The following estimates outline why. 
In today’s worldwide electricity production the share of nuclear power 
is 16 percent. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently estimated 
that the worldwide electricity production will double by 2030.7 In order to 
maintain the nuclear energy share at current levels, approximately 500 
new pressurized water reactors would have to be built. In order to raise the 
share to 32 percent, approximately 1500 new nuclear power plants would 
be necessary. Not only would this increase the use of uranium and in turn 
drastically shorten the reach of this resource, but it would also intensify 
the problem of ultimate disposal of nuclear waste—not to mention the 
overall problem of proliferation. The reach of the known resource base for 
nuclear power may be increased by meaningful improvements in uranium 
breakdown technology and by deployment of reprocessing facilities. In the 
light of necessary governmental and technical security standards, how-
ever, the chances are that not many states outside the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) could or should want to 
 
5  Rogner, H.-H. (1997) An Assessment of World Hydrocarbon Resources. Annual Review of 
Energy and Environment 22, 217–262. 
6  Marland, G., Boden, T. A., and Andres, R. J. (2003) Global, Regional, and National CO2 
Emissions. In Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change. Carbon Dioxide Infor-
mation Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak 
Ridge. 
7  International Energy Agency (2004) World Energy Outlook 2004. IEA, Paris. 191–204. 
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apply them. Moreover, it is questionable whether nuclear fission will be 
able to compete with other mitigation options in the long run because of 
its relatively high investment costs. 
On the other hand, the poor reputation of allegedly costly renewable 
energy is not justified: it is commonly recognized that at present renew-
able energy is more expensive than fossil energy, but it is also indisputable 
that its costs can be reduced through learning-by-doing. In fact, such 
reductions are already observed.8 The potential to reduce costs is expressed 
by the so-called learning rate, which indicates the percentage cost reduc-
tion per unit of power for every doubling of the installed capacity. The 
higher the installed capacity, the lower the price per kilowatt. The overall 
costs for the transformation of the energy system depends crucially on this 
learning rate. 
During the transition stage, we observe rising demand for energy re-
lated services in our scenario, due to the building up of a regenerative 
infrastructure. During this time, energy efficiency improvements keep 
emissions from rising along with energy consumption. Only by means of 
higher energy efficiency can the share of renewable energy be augmented 
without defying the climate protection goal. Further results from the 
energy scenario described above show that efficiency gains alone are not 
sufficient in the long run. Nevertheless, the short to medium-term 
potential to save energy is substantial. 
Still, the high share of fossil fuels even in the climate protection scenar-
ios implies that the dependence on oil and gas remains an important geo-
political risk for Europe, US and China. In the medium-term this depend-
ence can be reduced by increasing energy efficiency and by diversifying oil 
and gas imports. However, the increased energy efficiency in industrial-
ized countries will be overcompensated by a rapid growing oil demand in 
China and India substantially increasing global oil demand and oil prices. 
Because of this growing energy demand, energy security cannot be further 
increased for these countries by diversification of their oil and gas imports 
alone beyond 2020. The issue is amplified by the fact that 70 percent of 
conventional oil and 40 percent of natural gas resources are concentrated 
in the so-called Strategic Ellipse comprising countries like Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Russia.9 The countries in the Strategic Ellipse are for the 
foreseeable future neither politically nor economically low-risk suppliers 
of oil and gas. Besides the diversification of imports and an increased 
energy efficiency, the most efficient ways to reduce the dependence on oil 
and gas further are by promoting renewable energy technologies and by 
developing new coal strategies. These options do not only comprise low-
emission power plants but also the opportunity for providing alternative 
 
8  International Energy Agency (2000) Experience Curve for Energy Technology Policy. 
IEA, Paris. 
9  Rempel, H. (2000) Geht die Kollenstoff-Ära zu Ende? Vortrag auf der DGMK/BGR-Ver-
anstaltung “Geowissenschaften für die Exploration und Produktion: Informationsbörse 
für Forschung und Industrie,” Hannover. Available at <http://www.bgr.de/b123/kw_aera/ 
kw_aera.htm>. 
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sources for feeding the transport sector with hydrogen, biofuels, or gas-to-
liquids. The urgent need for OECD and emerging industrialized countries 
like China and India for reducing supply side risks will be a powerful 
driver for the transformation of the energy system. 
Beyond 2030, the economic and technical development of renewable 
energy technologies is the central option not only for climate policy but 
also for reducing geopolitical risks. This conclusion remains valid if 
nuclear power becomes a more important option than in our scenarios. 
Even the most optimistic nuclear power scenarios predict only a 20 per-
cent share on the primary energy consumption in 2030. A reasonable 
strategy for promoting renewable energy technologies is a not only crucial 
for climate protection but also a medium-term requirement of energy 
security. 
This transformation for the energy system has also important implica-
tions for equity. It is a well-known fact that hydrocarbon-exporting coun-
tries suffer from their exports because of the misuse and inequitable dis-
tribution of rents from the energy trade. A clear symptom of the “Dutch 
disease” can be diagnosed if resource abundance in general or resource 
booms in particular shift resources away from sectors of the economy that 
have positive externalities on growth. In essence, Dutch disease leads to 
decreasing growth rates, because countries possessing abundant natural 
resource tend to have a larger service sectors and smaller manufacturing 
sectors than resource-poor economies.10 Therefore, economists believe that 
a comparative advantage in resource exporting is in many cases not a 
blessing but a major cause for an economic slow-down.11 
The transformation of the global energy system requires an increased 
share of renewable energy technologies, mainly in the developing coun-
tries in Africa because the efficiency of wind and solar energy is ten times 
higher there than in Europe. Now the crucial question emerges, whether 
Africa benefits from exporting electricity to Europe or not. Exporting 
electricity does not necessarily imply an infection with Dutch disease 
because investment in electricity infrastructure has positive externalities 
on economic growth and even on human capital. Moreover, electricity can 
be traded on markets and therefore induce revenues from export which 
can be invested in the domestic economy. It is worthwhile to check to 
what extent trading electricity could be part of an export-oriented growth 
strategy for developing countries especially in Africa. 
The International Energy Agency predicts an investment for energy-
supply infrastructure worldwide of about 16 trillion USD in the period 
2001–2030. Almost 10 trillion USD will be spent on power generation, 
transmission, and distribution alone. Developing countries will require 
almost half of global investment in the energy sector as a whole. Invest-
 
10  Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1997) The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and 
Growth. Unpublished working paper. 
11  Sala-i-Martin, X. and Subramanian, A. (2003) Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: 
An Illustration from Nigeria. IMF Working Paper WP/03/139. 
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ment needs amount to 1.2 trillion USD in Africa.12 Financing the required 
investment in developing countries is a challenge because domestic saving 
and investment shares in Africa are too small, so that a huge inflow of 
foreign direct investments is needed for enhancing the capacities for 
electricity production. Therefore, poorly developed domestic financial 
markets and high investment risks for foreign investors are the most 
important reasons for low investment shares and low economic growth 
rates. But some calculations show that renewable electricity from Africa 
would be competitive even without further reduction of costs by learning-
by-doing. A prerequisite of such an investment strategy are instruments for 
reducing the risk of foreign direct investment. We will discuss this aspect 
in the next section. 
III   How do we deal with risks? 
In this last section we conclude that, according to the magic square, 
promotion of renewable energy technologies is crucial in the long run. 
Fossil fuels, in particular gas and coal, will be the predominant source for 
primary energy until the middle of this century. In this section, we will 
discuss the instruments for implementing such a strategy. These instru-
ments do not represent a comprehensive global energy policy architecture. 
The discussion of these two pillars should only launch a debate that will 
hopefully lead to a more complete architecture. 
Creating a global market for renewables 
It is a common belief in economics that with the introduction of tradeable 
permits for CO2 (black trading), subsidies for renewable energy can no 
longer be justified.13 This argument would hold if the market for renew-
ables was an example of “perfect competition.” Unfortunately, it is not: for 
technical reasons, there is a failure of the market for renewable energy. 
Energy technologies exhibit increasing returns to scale: the higher the 
volume of production (or the installed capacity), the lower the cost per 
kilowatt-hour. As renewable energy resources have so far only taken initial 
steps in their development, whereas fossil energy resources have long been 
established in the market, investors will still not invest in renewable 
energy resources, even though costs below those for energy from fossil fuel 
are likely to be achieved in the long term. The reason for this is that the 
fossil energy system has already written off its high initial investment 
costs, whereas capital costs in the renewable energy sector are relatively 
high. Innovators who investigate new techniques in the initial stage 
reduce costs through “learning-by-doing.” Subsequent imitators benefit 
from these advances at no additional costs. Hence, in markets showing 
 
12  International Energy Agency (2003) World Energy Investment Outlook, IEA, Paris.  
25–29. 
13  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft. Zur Förderung 
erneuerbarer Energien. Stellungnahme vom 16. Januar 2004. 
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economies of scale, there is an incentive not to be a pioneering firm. But if 
all firms are waiting to follow a pioneering firm, none can do so. This 
effect becomes more pronounced when the entrepreneurs have shorter 
time horizons. It is economic common sense that internalizing this exter-
nality requires policy intervention. Whether renewable energy resources 
have the potential to compete with fossil energy resources with regard to 
price is still uncertain. With the introduction of a policy instrument to 
cure this market failure, renewable energies get a chance to prove their 
potential. However, one needs to be cautious when introducing a subsidy 
to remedy this market failure: subsidies are known to provoke mismanage-
ment, hence it is important to design the subsidy system well in order to 
prevent it from being inefficient. 
The Kyoto Protocol could be further developed by obliging the engaged 
countries to create a certain part of their energy production in the 
regenerative sector. This “green energy” should be traded at an interna-
tional level in order to encourage companies to reduce costs by selecting 
the most appropriate locations. For example, the Annex I countries could 
agree to increase the share of renewable energy resources in overall energy 
production by 10 percent by 2010. Network operators in the power supply 
system would be obliged to use a certain quota of the produced renewable 
energy in their networks. At the same, time a yet-to-be-further-defined 
department of environment should provide producers/vendors of regen-
erative power with tradeable green energy certificates, which would corre-
spond to the amount of regenerative power supplied. The network 
operators could receive the certificates either through production and 
supply of regenerative power or by purchasing them on the market. Both 
are viable ways to fulfill their obligations. Thus, competition takes place in 
the power market as well as in the certificates market. A network operator 
that produces more than its share of “green energy” could sell certificates. 
On the other hand, one that provides less than its share will be forced to 
buy certificates because fulfillment of the obligation is measured by the 
possession of certificates. 
It is likely that the installation of such markets will enable solar thermal 
plants, biomass, and wind energy to be competitive with fossil energy 
resources within the next decade. Vendors of regenerative energy will be 
encouraged to reduce costs quickly in order to increase market share and 
profit. The share of regenerative energy share in the overall energy mix 
could be regulated via national stipulations—prices and selection of the 
technique will be determined by the market. 
Finally, application of the subsidy must cease and renewables must 
enter unprotected competition alongside fossil energy in order to deter-
mine the long-term cost structure of the energy mix. Thus green energy 
certificates do not distort competition in favor of renewables, but in the first 
place they instantiate competition, through which the most cost-effective 
alternative will be unveiled. Without this subsidy there is no guarantee 
that the best alternative will prevail. 
Climate Policy and Energy Security 
International Network 
To Advance Climate Talks 





Setting up a market for “green energy” requires that quotas are valid in 
the long run and that a “stop-and-go” policy is avoided to offer security for 
long-term investments. Provided these conditions hold, entrepreneurs will 
invest in technology with high initial costs and late profitability. The 
crucial point will be that trade in green energy certificates takes place at 
an international level, giving investors incentives to select the best 
locations anywhere in the world. The market for renewables suffers from 
regional fragmentation. International trade for energy certificates could be 
a first important step to globalize the market for renewable energy. 
It is likely that a market for green energy certificates would not attract 
enough capital for financing a network allowing Africa to export electric-
ity. Therefore, public-private partnerships may be required for building up 
the required infrastructure for transmitting electricity. In order to finance 
such a network, a coalition of Annex I countries could issue tradable 
contracts, securities, or bonds entitling their owners to a fixed income 
expressed as an interest rate. In exchange for the security, investors on the 
capital market contribute their capital to the electricity network. After 
building up the electricity network, the access to the network and the 
supply of electricity could be auctioned. The profits from this auction are 
used to pay the contracted fixed income. This scheme will channel foreign 
direct investments in African countries and will also avoid—as already 
outlined above—infection with Dutch disease. These securities are tradable 
and can be sold even before the profits are realized. The purpose of 
securitization is to attract financing without using the international credit 
market for African countries itself in which these countries would have to 
pay relatively high interest rates. Because of this mechanism, the risks of 
investments in developing countries can substantially be reduced. A 
European-African electricity network would improve energy security for 
both regions and allow access to low-emission electricity. 
Energy security and CCS–Carbon sequestration bonds 
The way to a sustainable energy system must be bridged by fossil energy 
resources. Hence the use of geological formations is of great importance. 
The sequestration of 200 Gt of carbon in exploited gas and oil fields 
according to the WBGU proposal is possible at minimum risk.14 
For sustainable use of geological formations, two institutional problems 
must be solved. First, because of limited storage capacity one must levy a 
deposit price for using storage capacities such as saline aquifers and 
exploited gas fields. CO2 may then be “emitted” either into geological 
formations or into the atmosphere. As long as deposit price plus costs for 
transport and control is lower than the atmosphere’s usage price—for 
instance expressed in the permit price for CO2—storage in geological 
formations will be used. If it were certain that no CO2 would leak from 
 
14  German Scientific Advisory Council on Global Change (2003) World in Transition: 
Towards Sustainable Energy Systems. Earthscan, London and Sterling. 
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geological formations, tradable permits and the deposit price would 
provide all the necessary precautions for a sensible use of a sparse com-
modity. But, second, there is the risk of leakage. 
Leakage as such is not a catastrophic event from a climate point of view, 
as long as not all storage sites leak CO2 to a great extent at the same time. 
The probabilities of such accidents may not be known yet, but the maxi-
mal economic damage cost is easy to calculate: it equals the leaked 
amount of CO2 times the permit price for emissions at the time of the 
leakage. The leaked CO2 would then use the atmosphere as storage, of 
course without the permit price paid. In this case, the sequestration 
company must purchase the appropriate number of permits. Nevertheless, 
this strategy alone will not prevent the misuse of sequestration in geologi-
cal formations. Firms could speculate that CO2 will start to leak beyond 
their existence, that the permit price will fall in the long run, or that a 
later management will be confronted with the consequences. If the time 
horizon of risk-seeking investors and managers is shorter than the 
presumed event of leakage, storage in geological formations will pay 
because the risks can be passed on to later generations. Hence it is of 
foremost important to provide incentives to store CO2 in formations that 
are as secure as possible in their own interest. 
The implementation of carbon sequestration bonds offers the possibility 
of reasonable risk management: every firm willing to store CO2 in geologi-
cal formations must buy a predefined amount of bonds from an environ-
mental authority.15 From the firm’s point of view, these bonds are an asset 
as long as the CO2 remains in the geological formation. If this is the case 
indeed an interest rate will be paid. However, the bonds will be devalued 
every three years or so by the environmental authority unless the firm can 
prove without doubt that no CO2 has leaked. Otherwise, the bonds must be 
partially written off. 
The authority can use the money generated by leaked carbon to subsi-
dize renewables not yet ready for the market. This liability should com-
pensate the market penalties of the renewables arising from the fact that, 
without sequestration, they would have become profitable more quickly. If 
stored CO2 leaks from geological formations precious time required for a 
cost-effective transition of the energy system will be wasted. 
Carbon sequestration bonds must be tradable on markets: a firm can sell 
its bonds in order to increase its cash flow. But firms will be able to sell 
their bonds only if they can offer buyers a higher return on investment 
than a risk-free asset can. The magnitude of this risk surcharge will depend 
on how buyers assess the risk of a devaluation of the bonds. The firm can 
 
15  An analysis of carbon sequestration bonds in two variations (including the one 
presented here) can be found in Edenhofer, O., Held, H., and Bauer, N. (2005) A Regulatory 
Framework for Carbon Capturing and Sequestration within the Post-Kyoto Process. 
Accepted for publication in: Rubin, E. S., Keith, D. W., and Gilboy, C. F., eds., Proceedings 
of 7th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies. Volume 1: Peer-
Reviewed Papers and Plenary Presentations. IEA Greenhouse Gas Programme, Chelten-
ham. Forthcoming. 
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obtain high prices only if buyers are convinced of the storage site’s 
security. Hence there are incentives for the whole branch of business not 
to undermine confidence in the bonds. Because of the threat of devalua-
tion, the security standard for geological formations will emerge to a 
market-ready commodity. Namely, firms will face incentives to employ 
high-performance checks to ensure that the CO2 remains in the geological 
formations. The better this can be proved, the higher the value of the 
bonds. Because carbon sequestration bonds are tradable, investors, 
analysts, and customers can show their confidence by buying the bonds, 
even at high prices. Accordingly, the public participates in the decision 
about the extent to which sequestration should be applied. Risk assess-
ment for this technique is thus out of reach of the technocrats alone: more 
democracy concerning its employment and investments is guaranteed. 
IV   False Dichotomies 
So far the discussion about climate policy has been shaped by falsely posed 
alternatives—growth of energy supply without climate protection or 
climate protection without economic growth, energy security without 
equity or equity without economic growth. However, wrong alternatives 
constantly narrow the set of options. Tragic decisions are induced by a 
limited set of options. Therefore, what seems to be a dilemma can also hint 
at a wrongly posed problem—scientists, politicians, statesmen, and entre-
preneurs are always in danger of having their decisions dictated by false 
alternatives. 
On the basis of our model calculation, we have shown that even ambi-
tious climate protection goals can be achieved without substantial losses 
in economic growth if the share of renewable energy is increased, energy 
efficiency is enhanced, and CO2 is captured at point sources and stored in 
geological formations. We argue that this strategy will also improve energy 
security for developing and developed countries. Nobody can predict 
exactly how the energy system will evolve through the 21st century. Hence 
what is necessary is a stable political framework that allows entrepreneurs, 
investors, and consumers to investigate the most efficient techniques by 
trial and error. 
At the same time only techniques that do not cause irreversible damage 
should be used. Kyoto must come back to its most prominent task: the 
design and implementation of markets from which the optimal solutions 
will emerge by trial and error. A market for green energy certificates not 
only increases the efficiency of renewable energy, but also opens up 
opportunities for development in Africa, which can provide the proper 
sites for solar power generation. Carbon sequestration bonds could allow 
for moderate and controlled use of carbon capturing and sequestration. 
Today, the magical square seems to the majority to be an infeasible 
challenge. But tomorrow, the magical square could be a synonym for a 
sustainable, equitable, and efficient market economy. In that way the next 
energy crisis can be managed by a newly designed energy policy. 
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